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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 
No. 98-5027 
 
THE NUTRASWEET COMPANY, 
 
v. 
 
VIT-MAR ENTERPRISES, INC., a/k/a VITMAR; THE 
SHIBA GROUP; ROMANO FASHIONS, INC.; MANOJ 
PAREKH; NIMISHA PAREKH; HERSHEY'S TRUCKING & 
WAREHOUSE, INC.; HARRY OBERLANDER; JOHN DOES, 
X, Y, & Z, BEING ANY OTHER PERSONS OR ENTITIES 
PARTICIPATING IN THE DOMESTIC IMPORT SALE OR 
TRANSPORT OF THE SUBJECT SHIPMENT, 
 
Tekstilschik, a "John Doe", 
 
       Appellant. 
 
APPEAL FROM THE 
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY 
 
(D.C. No. 96-cv-02172) 
(District Judge: Nicholas H. Politan) 
 
ARGUED: October 30, 1998 
 
BEFORE: SLOVITER, GARTH, and MAGILL,* 
Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion Filed February 25, 1999) 
 
 
 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
*Honorable Frank Magill, Senior United States Circuit Judge for the 
Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals, sitting by designation. 
  
       Paul J. Dillon (ARGUED) 
       Bloom Rubenstein Karinja & Dillon, 
        P.C. 
       70 South Orange Avenue, Suite 215 
       Livingston, NJ 07039 
       Counsel for Appellant 
 
       Rodney A. Brown (ARGUED) 
       Eileen Fox 
       Cori Sherman 
       Brown & Fox, P.C. 
       110 East 59th Street 
       New York, NY 10022 
       Counsel for Appellee 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
MAGILL, Senior Circuit Judge. 
 
The NutraSweet Company (NutraSweet) obtained a 
preliminary injunction and writ of replevin granting 
NutraSweet possession of goods that were allegedly 
acquired by fraud. Tekstilschik (Tek), an intervenor and the 
purported owner of the goods, challenges both the 
preliminary injunction and writ of replevin. We lack 
jurisdiction to consider Tek's challenge to the writ of 
replevin and dismiss that portion of the appeal. Although 
we have jurisdiction to consider the validity of the 
preliminary injunction, we find that the issue is moot as a 
result of the District Court's modification of the writ of 
replevin. Therefore, we will reverse and remand with 
instructions to vacate. 
 
I. 
 
This is the second time these parties have appeared 
before this Court in this case. In deciding the previous 
appeal, this Court thoroughly explained the genesis of this 
lawsuit and the relationships and transactions between 
NutraSweet, Tek, and the named defendants. See 
NutraSweet Co. v. Vit-Mar Enters., Inc., 112 F.3d 689 (3d 
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Cir. 1997). We recite below only those facts relevant to the 
disposition of this appeal. 
 
NutraSweet produces a sugar substitute called "Equal 
Sweetener with NutraSweet" (Equal). In 1995, Vit-Mar 
Enterprises (Vitmar) and The Shiba Group (Shiba) proposed 
to distribute Equal to the Ukraine and Russia. NutraSweet 
agreed and sold several containers of Equal to Vitmar and 
Shiba for approximately $1.5 million. 
 
NutraSweet shipped the Equal with bills of lading that 
specifically restricted distribution to Russia and the 
Ukraine. Despite NutraSweet's attempts to restrict 
distribution of the Equal to Russia and the Ukraine, several 
containers were allegedly imported back into the United 
States.1 In May 1996 NutraSweet learned that U.S. 
Customs was prepared to release a shipment of the Equal 
into the U.S. market. NutraSweet filed a complaint and an 
Order to Show Cause in federal district court, seeking a 
writ of replevin and temporary restraining order (TRO). 
NutraSweet argued that the goods were obtained by fraud 
and that it was likely to succeed in recovering title to the 
goods. The District Court granted NutraSweet's request for 
a TRO and writ of replevin. After NutraSweet posted a 
$329,000 bond, the U.S. Marshals seized the Equal. 
 
When Tek2 learned that the goods had been seized, it 
intervened in this case to challenge the TRO. Initially the 
District Court refused to lift the TRO. After considering 
Tek's appeal, we instructed the District Court to vacate the 
TRO as to Tek because it had the effect of a preliminary 
injunction but had been entered without development of a 
preliminary injunction record and findings of fact. See 
NutraSweet, 112 F.3d at 694.3 However, we left the door 
open for the District Court to enter a preliminary injunction 
after it developed a proper record and made the requisite 
findings of fact. See id. at 695. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. NutraSweet also alleges that several containers were diverted before 
leaving the United States and distributed in the domestic market. 
 
2. Tek alleges that it acquired title to the Equal shipment at issue in 
this 
appeal through a barter transaction with another Russian entity. 
 
3. Tek did not challenge the writ of replevin in its first appeal to this 
Court. See NutraSweet, 112 F.3d at 691 n.3. 
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On remand, the District Court vacated the TRO, but 
entertained argument concerning the propriety of a 
preliminary injunction. After a hearing, the District Court 
entered a preliminary injunction, prohibiting Tek, its 
agents, and those acting in concert with Tek from "taking 
possession, control, or custody and/or marketing, selling, 
or otherwise distributing the shipments of Equal." In 
addition to opposing the preliminary injunction, Tek sought 
to vacate the writ of replevin, but the District Court denied 
its motion. The District Court later modified the writ of 
replevin to allow NutraSweet to take possession of the 
Equal, and NutraSweet increased its bond to $658,000. 
 
II. 
 
Tek first argues that the District Court erred in granting 
the preliminary injunction. We agree. 
 
We have appellate jurisdiction to review a district court's 
interlocutory order granting a preliminary injunction under 
28 U.S.C. S 1292(a)(1). We review a district court's order 
granting a preliminary injunction for abuse of discretion, its 
factual findings for clear error, and its determinations of 
questions of law de novo. See Acierno v. New Castle County, 
40 F.3d 645, 652 (3d Cir. 1994). 
 
A preliminary injunction is an extraordinary remedy that 
should be granted only if "(1) the plaintiff is likely to 
succeed on the merits; (2) denial will result in irreparable 
harm to the plaintiff; (3) granting the injunction will not 
result in irreparable harm to the defendant; and (4) 
granting the injunction is in the public interest." Maldonado 
v. Houstoun, 157 F.3d 179, 184 (3d Cir. 1998). A plaintiff's 
failure to establish any element in its favor renders a 
preliminary injunction inappropriate. See Opticians Ass'n of 
Am. v. Indep. Opticians of Am., 920 F.2d 187, 192 (3d Cir. 
1990). 
 
We had serious concern about the District Court's finding 
that NutraSweet's relationships with its domestic customers 
and distributors would be irreparably harmed in the 
absence of a preliminary injunction. In the absence of 
irreparable injury, no preliminary injunction would lie, even 
if the other three elements, noted above, were found. 
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Nevertheless, whether or not there was a possibility of 
irreparable harm to NutraSweet at the time NutraSweet 
applied for a preliminary injunction, it now appears that 
NutraSweet can suffer no harm because, as explained 
above, NutraSweet has obtained possession of the Equal by 
the District Court's order modifying the writ of replevin. 
Because the writ of replevin now adequately protects 
NutraSweet's interest in preventing distribution of the 
goods in the United States during the pendency of this suit, 
the preliminary injunction entered by the District Court 
now becomes an unnecessary remedy that must be 
vacated. See Anderson v. Davila, 125 F.3d 148, 163 (3d Cir. 
1997) ("An injunction is appropriate only where there exists 
a threat of irreparable harm such that legal remedies are 
rendered inadequate."). Thus, the question of whether a 
preliminary injunction was warranted by earlier 
circumstances is now moot and the preliminary injunction 
previously entered must be vacated. See United States v. 
Munsingwear, Inc., 340 U.S. 36, 39-40 (1950). 
 
III. 
 
Tek also contends that the District Court erred in issuing 
the writ of replevin. We decline to rule on Tek's challenge to 
the writ of replevin because we lack appellate jurisdiction.4 
 
Congress has conferred jurisdiction on the courts of 
appeal over interlocutory orders in limited situations. See 
28 U.S.C. S 1292. Section 1292(a) allows courts of appeal to 
hear challenges to "[i]nterlocutory orders of the district 
court of the United States . . . granting, continuing, 
modifying, refusing, or dissolving injunctions, or refusing to 
dissolve or modify injunctions . . . ." 28 U.S.C. S 1292(a)(1). 
This Circuit has defined "injunctions" under section 
1292(a)(1) as: "Orders that are directed to a party, 
enforceable by contempt, and designed to accord or protect 
some or all of the substantive relief sought by a complaint 
in more than a [temporary] fashion." Cohen v. Board of 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. Although the parties did not raise this Court's jurisdiction to 
consider 
the validity of the writ of replevin, this Court, as a court of limited 
jurisdiction, must sua sponte raise the issue of appellate jurisdiction. 
See 
Ortiz v. Dodge, 126 F.3d 545, 547 (3d Cir. 1997). 
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Trustees of the Univ. of Med. & Dentistry of N.J., 867 F.2d 
1455, 1465 n.9 (3d Cir. 1989) (en banc) (alteration in 
original; quotations omitted). 
 
We lack jurisdiction to hear Tek's challenge to the writ of 
replevin because it does not fall within the definition of 
"injunction." Unlike an injunction, the writ of replevin in 
this case was directed to the U.S. Marshals, not to a party 
to the suit against whom the order could be enforced by 
threat of contempt. Cf. Santana Prods., Inc. v. Compression 
Polymers, Inc., 8 F.3d 152, 155 (3d Cir. 1993) (party cannot 
be held in contempt for failing to comply with an order that 
contains no provision with which it must comply). 
Furthermore, the writ, as modified, does accord NutraSweet 
some of the relief it ultimately desires (possession of the 
Equal), but it is only a provisional remedy, and the District 
Court reserved the right to order NutraSweet to return the 
Equal to Tek if NutraSweet does not ultimately prevail. J.A. 
at 352. Because the writ of replevin is not an injunction for 
purposes of section 1292(a)(1), we hold that it is not an 
appealable interlocutory order. See, e.g., HBE Leasing Corp. 
v. Frank, 48 F.3d 623, 632 (2d Cir. 1995) ("the provisional 
remedies of attachment and replevin . . . do not constitute 
injunctions for the purposes of section 1292(a)(1)"); FDIC v. 
Elio, 39 F.3d 1239, 1249 (1st Cir. 1994) ("attachments are 
not among the interlocutory orders appealable under 28 
U.S.C. S 1292(a)"); Cohen, 867 F.2d at 1464 ("orders 
attaching security for a judgment ultimately to be rendered 
have been held not to fall under section 1292(a)(1), even 
though such orders have a significant impact on the parties 
whose property is affected" (citing cases)); United States v. 
Hansen, 795 F.2d 35, 39 (7th Cir. 1986) ("Orders of 
replevin and attachment are not appealable under 28 
U.S.C. S 1292(a)(1)." (citing cases)); accord 16 Wright, Miller 
& Cooper, Federal Practice & Procedure S 3922.3, at 116 
(1996) ("Enforcement of such traditional security devices as 
attachment and replevin ordinarily is thought not to involve 
an injunction within the meaning of S 1292(a)(1)."). 
 
IV. 
 
For the foregoing reasons, we will reverse and remand 
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with instructions to vacate the preliminary injunction.5 We 
dismiss Tek's appeal of the writ of replevin for lack of 
jurisdiction. 
 
A True Copy: 
Teste: 
 
       Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals 
       for the Third Circuit 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. The District Court is obviously not precluded from entering another 
preliminary injunction if it develops the record and makes adequate 
findings of fact that satisfy the requirements for a preliminary 
injunction. 
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